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1. INTRODUCTION 
Receivables potentially constitute the single largest category 
of assets transferred in cross-border financing transactions. Being 
intangible, however, their transfer is not physically apparent. Be-
cause the problem of evidencing, or perfecting, these transfers has 
been addressed in various ways by different countries, there is no 
international perfection standard. This lack of a standard deters 
the growth of receivables financing, which in turn impedes eco-
nomic development. Recently, however, the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") 
drafted a Convention on Assignment in Receivables Financing 
(the "Convention")1 to regulate cross-border receivables transac-
tions. The Convention provides for an optional registration sys-
tem for perfection.2 I use empirical evidence and historical anal-
ogy to argue that it is in the interest of the countries that become 
parties to the Convention to opt for that system. 
It has been noted that "in developed countries the bulk of 
corporate wealth is locked up in receivables."3 As the economy 
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becomes globalized, this wealth increasingly is unlocked by trans-
ferring receivables across national borders.4 In this Article, I ana-
lyze how those transfers can be made more efficient, especially in 
light of the Convention.5 
My analysis (Section 4) proceeds in three parts. In Section 4.1, 
I briefly describe receivables financing, focusing on its increas-
ingly dominant form, securitization.6 In Section 4.2, I examine 
the potential impact of the Convention and in Section 4.3, I use 
empirical evidence and historical analogy to demonstrate the 
benefits of a centralized registration system for perfection. 
2. INTRODUCTION TO RECEIVABLES FINANCING 
AND SECURITIZATION 
Receivables financing7 has experienced remarkable growth 
over the past two decades, partly because receivables are self-
liquidating and are an excellent short-term source of cash.8 Per-
haps the oldest and most basic form of receivables financing is fac-
toring, in which companies- traditionally those in the textile and 
4 See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Universal Langua~e of Cross-Border Finance, 8 
DUKE J. COMPo & lNT'L L. 235, 236-37 (1998) [heremafter Universal Language]. 
5 This Article uses the Convention's terminology, referring to the obligor 
of a receivable as its debtor. Readers should be careful to distinguish this usage 
from the UCC's use of the term "debtor" to mean an assignor of receivables. 
6 Article 5(d) of the Convention defines receivables financing as "any 
transaction in which value, credit or related services are provided in the form 
of receivables [and therefore to include] factoring, forfaiting, securitization, 
project financing and refinancing." Convention, supra note 1 art. 5(d). Al-
though the Convention does not appear to define the term receivables, I use 
that term to include any financial asset that, by its terms, converts into cash 
within a finite period of time. Examples include accounts receivable, chattel 
paper, instruments, lease rentals, franchise and license fees, and other ri~hts to 
or expectations of {layment. See generally Issuers of Asset-Backed SecuritIes, 17 
C.F.R. § 270.3a-7(O)(1) (1999) (containing a similar definition). 
7 Receivables financing is a subset of secured financing, and it is beyond 
this Article's scope to question secured financing. For a debate on that Issue, 
comE are Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Prior-
ity oJSecured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996) (arguing that giv-
ing full priority to secured financing is inefficient), with Steven L. Schwarcz, 
The Easy Case/or the Priority o/Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47DUKE L.J. 425 
(1997) (arguing not only that secured financing is efficient, but that securitiza-
tion and other "non-recourse" forms of secured financing are particularly valu-
able). 
8 See generally PETER H. WEIL, PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, ASSET-
BASED LENDING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SECURED FINANCING (2d ed. 
1992). 
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apparel industries- raise money by selling their accounts receiv-
able at a discount to finance companies, called "factors.,,9 The 
company usually assumes all risk of non-payment of the accounts 
except for the account debtor's inability to pay.lO 
Another form of receivables financing is asset securitization. 
Touted as "by far the most rapidly growing segment of the u.s. 
credit markets," 11 asset securitization increasingly is becoming a 
major part of foreign credit markets as well. l2 In a typical securi-
tization, a company sells rights in receivables to a special purpose 
vehicle ("SPV"). The SPY, in turn, issues securities to capital 
market investors and uses the proceeds of the issuance to pay for 
the receivables. l3 The investors, who are repaid from collections 
of the receivables, buy the securities based on their assessment of 
the value of those assets. Because the Spy (and no longer the 
company) owns the receivables, their investment decision often 
can be made without concern for the company's financial condi-
tion. Thus, viable companies that otherwise cannot obtain fi-
nancing because of a weakened financial condition can now do so. 
Even companies that otherwise could obtain financing will now 
be able to obtain lower-cost capital market financing. 14 
9 See id. at 179. 
10 Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy 0/ Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J. L., 
Bus. & FIN. 133, 144 (1994) [hereinafter Alchemy] (quoting PETER H. WEIL, 
FACfORING IN AsSET BASED FINANCING: A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE § 
27.01[1] (Matthew Bender ed., 1985». 
11 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death o/Liability, 106 YALEL.J. 1,24 (1996). 
12 See Symposium, International Issues in Cross-Border Securitization and 
Structured Finance, 8 DUKEJ. COMPo & lNT'LL. 229 (1998) [hereinafter Cross-
Border Symposium]. For an introduction to the fundainentaI legal principles of 
cross-border securitization and finance, see generally Universal Language, supra 
note 4. 
13 For authorities on securitization, see generally TAMAR FRANKEL, 
SECURITIZATION: STRUCfURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSETS POOLS, AND 
AsSET-BACKED SECURITIES (1991 & Supp. 1999); JASON H.P. KRAVlTT, THE 
SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS (1996); STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, 
STRUCfURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET 
SECURITIZATION (2d ed. 1993); Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and 
Corporate Risk Allocation, 72 TUL. L. REv. 101 (1997); Claire A. Hill,Securiti-
zation: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061 (1996);AI-
cherny, supra note 10. 
14 For an explanation of the relationsh~ between securitization and factor-
ing, see Alchemy, supra note 10, at 144-46 tnoting that the differences between 
factoring and securitization begin to blur where SPVs borrow funds from non-
capital market sources instead of issuing securities or where factors issue capital 
market securities). 
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Securitization has an increasingly international focus, in part 
because companies that wish to raise funds from capital markets 
may not be located in countries with established capital markets 
or may be located in countries with developing capital markets 
that lack the depth of developed markets in other States. In order 
to access capital market funding, those companies will have to 
structure deals that cross their national borders. 15 
Finally, an increasingly common variant of receivables financ-
ing is project finance. This involves the financing of develop-
ment, construction, and operation of such capital-intensive facili-
ties as power plants, oil and gas pipelines, transportation systems, 
mining facilities, and industrial and manufacturing plants. 16 The 
key is that these projects must be expected to generate revenues 
sufficient to repay the financing. 17 In the construction phase of 
the project, financing is usually raised by secured borrowing, with 
equity provided by general or limited partnerships. After the 
project's completion, permanent financing is raised in various 
ways, including secured borrowing or leveraged leasing. 18 
Recognizing that a growing segment of the world's money is 
locked into receivables,19 and realizing the possibilities for eco-
nomic growth by unleashing that wealth, UNCITRAL has un-
dertaken a project to simplify cross-border receivables financing 
and reduce its cost.20 UNCITRAL's work to that end has focused 
on drafting the Convention. 
3. THE IMPACT OF UNCITRAL's PROPOSED CONVENTION 
Although this Article focuses on the Convention's optional 
registration system for perfection, there is no doubt that, even ab-
sent a registration system, the Convention would still bring a sig-
nificant measure of commercial uniformity to cross-border re-
15 See Universal Language, supra note 4, at 236-37. 
16 See Daniel R. Bedford et. al., Project Financing, C749 A.L.I-A.B.A 177, 
181 (1992). 
17 See id. 
18 See id. 
19 See Spiro V. Bazinas, An International Legal Regime for Receivables Fi· 
nancing: UNClTRAL's Contribution, 8DUKEJ. COMPo & INT'LL. 315 (1998). 
20 UNCITRAL's Working Group on International Contract Practices 
("Working Group") ftrst began work on receivables ftnancing in 1995. See id. 
at 316. 
1999] CROSS-BORDER RECEIVABLES FINANCING 459 
ceivables financing, thereby enhancing its viability and reducing 
its cost. Set forth below are a few brief examples. 
Future Receivables. Receivables financing, especially securiti-
zation, increasingly depends on the assignment of future receiv-
ables, such as franchise or license fees. Yet, foreign law is often 
unsettled as to whether or not to allow the assignment of receiv-
ables not yet in existence. The Convention would clarify that fu-
ture receivables may be assigned.21 Moreover, the Convention 
would validate the assignment of receivables in bulk, without the 
need to identify individual receivables, so long as "the receiv-
abies ... can be identified [as receivables] ... to which the as-
signment relates. »22 
Commingling. A significant risk in receivables financing is 
that the mixing or "commingling» of collections of assigned re-
ceivables with the assignor's own funds may appear inconsistent 
with the assignee's interest. The assignee could then lose its right 
to those collections. The Convention would eliminate this risk.23 
Contractual Restrictions. Sometimes the agreement pursuant 
to which the receivables are created prohibits their assignment. 
For example, leases and licenses sometimes prohibit assignment of 
the underlying receivables even though the debtor would not be 
harmed by the assignment of rights. An assignee would then be 
deterred from engaging in receivables financing because of the 
fear of liability, litigation, or the possible ineffectiveness of the as-
signment. The Convention permits assignments notwithstanding 
the prohibition.2'~ However, the Convention still may protect 
21 Article 10(2) of the Convention provides that " [a]n assignment may re-
late to existing or future. . . receivables, and to 1?arts of or unruvided interests 
in receivables." Convention, supra note 1, art. lOl2). Article 9(2) clarifies that a 
new writing is not required to be entered into for each receivable when it 
arises. See iii. art. 9(2). 
22 Id. art. 10(1)(b). 
23 Article 17(2)-(3) of the Convention provides that "if payment is made to 
the assignor ... [or to] another person, including ... a creClitor of the assis;nor 
or the insolvency administrator, the assignee has a right in whatever is receIved 
by that person." Id. art. 17(2)-(3). Article 16(1) also would lessen the likelihood 
that commingling would occur, by authorizing the assignor or assignee to no-
tify the debtor to pay the assisnee directly: "[T]he assignor or the assignee or 
both may send the debtor notification of the assignment and request that pay-
ment be made to the assignee." Id. art. 16(1). 
24 Article 12(1) of the Convention provides that "[a] receivable is trans-
ferred to the assignee notwithstanding any agreement between the assignor and 
the debtor limiting [assignment] .... " Id. art. 12(1). 
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debtors who would be harmed by the assignment. Although the 
assignee is not liable to debtors for breach of contract, the as-
signor may be liable depending on the applicable nationallaw.25 
The Convention also protects debtors by clarifying that the as-
signment of receivables does not increase their burden.26 
Preferential and Fraudulent Transfers. Bankruptcy and insol-
vency laws often seek to assure equality of distribution of a com-
pany's estate and sometimes seek to rehabilitate troubled compa-
nies. The Convention does not cover this directly, but it does 
generally specify the choice of insolvency law would apply.27 
This allows the parties to a receivables financing to better under-
stand their rights by consulting insolvency counsel who are ex-
perts in that law. 
Perfection and Priority. Perfection is the term sometimes used 
to describe protection of an assignee's interest in transferred assets 
as against the assignor's creditors and insolvency administrator. 
Because receivables are intangible, there is nothing physical to 
transfer. Hence, the transfer of receivables may require additional 
steps, such as notifying debtors on the receivables of the transfer, 
to become effective. These steps, however, sometimes can be on-
erous and costly, thereby discouraging receivables financing. 28 
Priority refers to the ranking of multiple claims against a 
transferred asset. In a receivables financing context, the assignee 
usually wants its claims against the transferred receivables to be 
superior in ranking to any third-party claims, including that of 
the assignor's trustee in bankruptcy as well as claims of other as-
signees from the same assignor.2 Priority is generally accorded to 
the first assignee to perfect, under a rule sometimes referred to as 
25 Article 12(2) of the Convention states that "[n]othing in this article af-
fects any obligation or liability of the assignor to the debtor in respect of an 
assignment made in breach of an agreement ... but the assignee is not liable to 
the oebtor for such a breach." Id. art. 12(2). 
26 Thus, Article 7(1) of the Convention provides that"assignment [has no] 
... effect on rights and obligations of the deotor." Id. art. 7(1). 
27 Article 24(2) of the Convention provides that priority between an as-
signee of receivables and the assignor's Insolvency administrator, is ~overned 
by the law of the country where the assignor is located. Seeid. art. 24(2). 
28 However, even where no additional steps are reguired, receivables fi-
nancing may be discouraged. In Germany, for example, although no addi-
tional steps are needed, assignees have no publicly available means of ascertain-
ing prionty. See infra notes 2944 and accompanying text. 
29 See Universal lAnguage, supra note 4, at 241. 
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"first in time, first in right."30 In international transactions, the 
term priority sometimes is used to include the concept of perfec-
tion, because one cannot have priority unless one has perfected. 
Without a system for making transfers of receivables publicly 
ascertainable, receivables financings are discouraged because as-
signees will not be able to determine their priority at the time of 
the transfer. The Convention proposes an optional registration 
system that could be used to provide such notice.31 Under that 
system, "[a]s between assignees of the same receivables from the 
same assignor, priority is determined by the order in which cer-
tain information ... is registered under this Convention, regard-
less of the time of [the] transfer of the receivables."32 A limita-
tion, however, is that in the current draft of the Convention this 
registration system is optional, not mandatory.33 Hence, different 
States could adopt different perfection procedures, and the uni-
formity of a common registration system would not be achieved. 
Without a common registration system, assignees of receivables 
may be unable to search filing records to determine whether 
those receivables previously were assigned to others. The assignee 
then cannot ascertain through publicly available information the 
priority of its rights in the receivables, and therefore may be 
30 See, e.g., V.C.C. § 9-312(5). See also ALAN SCHWARTZ & ROBERT E. 
SCOTT, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, PRINCIPLES AND POUCIES 664-65 (2d 
ed. 1991) (providing a critique of this rule). 
31 Many of the "specific features" of the Convention's registration system 
are still unresolved, however. See Electronic Mail from Spiro Bazinas to Steven 
L. Schwarcz 1 (May 3, 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter Electronic Mail, 
Bazinas] 
32 Convention, supra note 1, art. 34. This rule contrasts with a rule that 
would determine priority by the time of transfer of the receivables, which is 
not always ascertamable. 
33 Even absent a registration system, it should be noted that the Conven-
tion's rules on perfection and priority would increase clarity by specifying the 
choice of law for determining priority. Because receivables are intangible and 
not located in any given jurisCliction, the law of the assignor's jurisdiction lo~i­
cally would be expected to govern perfection; the Convention so provides m 
Article 23(1): "Priority among severo assignees of the same receivables from 
the same assignor is ~overned by the law of the State in which the assignor is 
located." Id. art. 23t1). The Convention also reco~nizes contractual subordi-
nation, or changing of relative priority. Article 23t2) provides that"conflicts 
of ,eriority may be settled by agreement among competing assignees." Id. art. 
23t2). This provides the flexibility to introduce commercially importantsecu-
ritization structures, such as master trusts, in which different classes of inves-
tors in the SPY's securities could contract for different priority at different 
times. See id. art. 23(1)-(2). 
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forced to rely on representations of the assignor. Assignors that 
are insufficiently capitalized to back up their representations 
therefore may find it difficult to engage in a receivables financing. 
Why is the Convention's proposed registration system merely 
optional? Concerns over registration have been expressed in the 
working group responsible for drafting the Convention, such as 
that registration could violate privacy and confidentiality or could 
negatively affect competition.34 However, some believe these 
concerns may be more speculative than real.35 
I am not competent to judge whether, politically, making reg-
istration mandatory would be a preferable strategy over the Con-
vention's optional approach. In the former case, some States 
might refuse to become signatories to the Convention, but those 
that do would gain its full benefit; in the latter case, more States 
would become signatories to the Convention, but those not opt-
ing for registration would lose the Convention's most significant 
benefit. I next attempt to demonstrate that it is in each State's in-
terest to opt for registration. 
4. ANALYSIS 
4.1. A Centralized Registration System is Needed 
Few would dispute the desirability of having uniform laws 
govern cross-border commercial transactions such as receivables 
financing. Inconsistencies between the laws of different States can 
34 See generally Report of the Working Group on International Contract Prac-
tices on the Work of its Twenty-Ninth Session, U.N. GAOR, Int'l. Trade Law 
Comm., 32nd Sess, Paragraphs 18-44, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/445 (1999); Elec-
tronic_Mail, Bazinas, supra note 31. Those States with their own registration 
systems could also find their systems replaced, jeopardizing internal jobs and 
revenue production. In that context, a possible compromise might be to allow 
States die option of retaining their own registration systems, to which the 
Convention's choice of law rule would point. See infra note 98 and accompa-
nying text (explainin~ that the U.S. perfection system works this way unaer 
Article 9 of the UCC). 
35 See, e.g., Electronic Mail from Alejandro Garro to Steven L. Schwarcz 1-
2 (May 2, 1999) (on me with author) (observing that"much of the concerns are 
raised by s.eecUlation, rather than mformed opinions as to the impact that a 
mandatory international registration system would bring about," and compar-
ing the aviation industry's proposed international registration system for secu-
rity interests in aircraft pursuant to a protocol to the International Institute for 
the Unification of Private Law's ("UNIDROIT") Convention on Security In-
terests in Mobile Equipment). 
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make "commercial practice uncertain, time-consuming, and ex-
pensive."36 The problem, at its simplest, is twofold: an assignee of 
receivables from a foreign assignor may not know which State's 
law governs perfection; furthermore, if the law of the assignor's 
State applies, the assignee's rights would be subject to the vagaries 
of that foreign law.37 
The Convention would solve the first problem by making the 
law of the assignor's State govern perfection.38 Although it does 
not necessarily solve the second problem, it does attempt to do so 
by providing an optional registration system for perfection.39 If, 
therefore, the assignor's State has opted to adopt that system, per-
fection would be accomplished through registration. 
There is, however, another layer to the perfection problem-
a layer that is exacerbated by cross-border transactions, but that 
could arise even in a purely domestic transaction. If the assignor's 
State neither has adopted the Convention's registration system 
nor enacted a domestic registration system for perfection, the as-
signee would be unable to ascertain the priority of its interest in 
the transferred receivables. The following examples demonstrate 
this potential problem. 
Without some form of public registration, a system can estab-
lish perfection, but cannot unequivocally be used to ascertain pri-
ority. First, consider a wholly domestic transfer in which an as-
signor assigns a given receivable to an assignee in the same State. 
If receivables transfers are not recorded, the assignee has no objec-
tive way of determining whether that receivable was previously 
transferred to a third party.40 Likewise, unless the assignor dis-
closes it, the assignee of a subsequent transfer by the assignor of 
that receivable has no way of learning of the first transfer. 
The situation becomes even more complicated for cross-
border transfers. Consider a simple receivables transfer between 
36 Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory Rulemak-
ing Process o/Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REv. 909, 940 (1995). 
37 The assignor therefore may need to retain foreign counsel to be certain 
of its rights. 
38 See supra note 33 (referring to Article 23(1) of the Convention, which 
provides that U[p ]riority among several assignees of the same receivables from 
the same assignor is governed by the law of the State in which the assignor is 
located"). 
39 See supra text accompanying notes 31-33. 
40 Such a prior transfer might have been made, for example, through the 
assignor's fraua or mistake. 
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parties in two States, both of which have adopted the Convention 
but only one of which- the assignee's State- has opted for the 
Convention's registration system. Perfection and priority would 
be governed by the law of the assignor's State.41 However, unless 
the assignor's State has a domestic registration system, the as-
signee would have the same difficulty ascertaining priority as de-
scribed in the preceding paragraph. 
The greater the number of transfers, the potentially more dif-
ficult the problem. Consider, for example, receivables transfers 
among parties in three States, and assume that States 1 and 3 have 
adopted the Convention and its registration system, but State 2 
has adopted neither. Although it might appear that the priority 
in receivables transferred between States 1 and 3 would be gov-
erned by the Convention's registration system, that result does 
not necessarily follow. For example, an assignor in State 1 could 
make a transfer of its receivables to an initial assi~nee in State 2. 
If that assignee perfects under its domestic law,4 it would rea-
sonably expect to have priority as to those receivables. Later, 
however, the assignor either fraudulently or mistakenly could 
transfer all or a portion of the same receivables to a subsequent 
assignee in State 3. If the subsequent assignee searches the inter-
national registration system, sees no prior recording as to those 
receivables, and then perfects the transfer in accordance with in-
ternational registration procedures, the subsequent assignee would 
reasonably expect to have priority rights in those receivables. 
Thus, there is a conflict of priority between the rights of the ini-
tial assignee and the subsequent assignee. 
Tinkering with the system- for example, restricting interna-
tional registration to cross-border transfers of receivables- would 
also fail to solve the problem. Consider an assignor in State 1 that 
makes a domestic transfer of receivables to an initial assignee in 
the same State. If the initial assignee perfects this transfer under 
domestic law, that assignee would reasonably expect to have pri-
ority as to those receivables. Later, however, the assignor either 
fraudulently or mistakenly could transfer all or a portion of the 
same receivables to a subsequent assignee in State 3. If the subse-
quent assignee searches the international registration system, sees 
41 See supra note 33. 
42 This assumes that the conflicts law of State 2 points to that State's do-
mestic law for perfecting transfers to in-State assignees. 
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no prior recording as to those receivables, and then perfects this 
cross-border transfer in accordance with international registration 
systems procedures, the subsequent assignee would reasonably 
expect to have priority rights in those receivables. Again, a con-
flict of priority exists between the rights of the initial assignee and 
the subsequent assignee. 
The same dilemma arises when the first assignment is interna-
tional. Consider an assignor in State 1 that transfers receivables 
to an initial assignee in State 3. If the initial assignee perfects this 
cross-border transfer in accordance with international registration 
procedures, it would reasonably expect to have priority rights in 
those receivables. Later, however, the assignor, either fraudu-
lently or mistakenly, could transfer all or a portion of the same 
receivables to a subsequent assignee in State 1. If the subsequent 
assignee follows the domestic procedures for ascertaining priority, 
sees no prior transferee, and then perfects this domestic transfer 
in accordance with the domestic law of State 1, the subsequent as-
signee would reasonably expect to have priority rights in those 
receivables. Once again, there is a conflict of priority between 
the rights of the initial assignee and the subsequent assignee. 
Other tinkering approaches would equally fail to solve the 
problem. For example, registration could not be limited to trans-
fers of international receivables, i.e., those having foreign debtors, 
because international receivables are often transferred domesti-
cally.43 Consider an assignor in State 1 that makes a domestic 
transfer to an assignee in State 1 of international receivables of a 
debtor in another State. The way out of this morass is for all 
States, or at least those with companies needing access to the li-
quidity provided by receivables financing, to adopt a centralized 
registration system for perfection.44 
I next examine empirical studies showing that centralized reg-
istration is not only the most effective domestic perfection sys-
43 Indeed, the same receivables, irrespective of the location of the debtors, 
could be transferred domestically one day and internationally the next, or vice 
versa. 
44 Even the registration system proposed by the Convention does not ~o as 
far as it theoretically should because it covers only: assignments of internatIOnal 
receivables- those in which the assignor and debtor are located in different 
States- and international assignments of receivables- those in which the as-
signor and assignee are located in different States. See Convention, SURra note 1, 
arts. 1(a), 3. The author shows above, however, that a rational peifection and 
priority system should cover the assignments of all receivables. 
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tern, but it will raise a State's gross domestic product by increas-
ing corporate access to credit. Thereafter, I discuss the increasing 
number of civil and common law States that recently have 
adopted centralized registration systems. Finally, I show by anal-
ogy that the development of centralized registration in the federal 
system of the United States provides compelling evidence in favor 
of a cross-border registration system. 
4.2. Empirical Evidence Supports Centralized Registration 
4.2.1. Evidence from Empirical Studies 
Empirical studies by the Center for the Economic Analysis of 
Law (the "Center") confirm the importance of a registration sys-
tem, even for domestic transfers of receivables.45 The Center 
studied how inadequate legal frameworks in three States- Gua-
temala, Nicaragua, and Romania- limited access to credit. In 
Guatemala, for example, there was no registration system for per-
fection of receivables transfers. The absence of such a system was 
a key constraint on economic development: "Compared to a bor-
rower who cannot offer good collateral, a borrower with such 
collateral can expect to get six to eight times more credit .... "46 
A registration system, however, would encourage the extension 
of credit by enabling lenders to ascertain their priority: 
By encumbering as collateral [their] portfolios of accounts 
or small loans, businesses could obtain the cash necessary 
to purchase more inventories and generate even more 
sales. Where such financing is possible, it permits credit to 
expand rapidly in response to the needs of the busi-
ness .... Accounts receivable are often the only unencum-
45 See infra notes 46, 47, and 56 and accompanying text. These studies are 
empirical in that they rely on numerous field interviews. 
46 Heywood W. Fleisig & Nuria de la Peiia, Guatemala: How Problems in 
the Framework for Secured Transactions Limit Access to Credit (Nov. 1998) 
<http://www.ceal.org> . [hereinafter Guatemala]. The study further ob-
served that "[t]he problem of the limited access to credit has been recognized 
everywhere as constraining growth and aggravating poverty." Id. at 2. 
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bered floating assets that a [business] has available to se-
cure a loan for working capital.47 
Productivity per worker gains when farms and businesses 
can profitably hold larger inventories .... 48 
Under Guatemalan law, the assignment of receivables is 
perfected by notification of debtors. That approach, how-
ever, not only was found to be "costly because it requires no-
tifying each account debtor," but the system is also risky. 
"There is no requirement that all transfers of accounts be reg-
istered in a public registry to prevail in collecting against the 
accounts." 49 Therefore, "[t]he whole secured transactions 
framework becomes more risky because potential lenders 
cannot easily discover all existing claims in collateral .... "50 
467 
The study found that the absence of centralized registration 
was the most significant explanation for why credit was limited. 
Adjusting for inflation, Guatemalan borrowers, if they are offered 
loans at all, pay thirty-three to thirty-eight percentage ?t0ints 
higher interest than u.s. borrowers on equipment loans. I Of 
that additional cost, "[a]bout 4.34 percentage points arise from 
macroeconomic uncertainty, 1.76 percentage points arise from 
the greater bank spreads, and the balance arises from the extra 
risk of equipment lending in the Guatemalan framework for se-
47 [d. at 14. Accord, Heywood W. Fleisig & Nuria de la Pefia, Nicaragua: 
How Problems in the Framework for Secured Transactions Limit Access to Credit 
(Feb. 1998) <http://www.ceal.org> [hereinafter Nicaragua]. 
48 Guatemala, supra note 46, at 43 (contrasting "[a] secured transaction sys-
tem that directs credit away from more rapidly growing businesses and toward 
slower growing businesses [which] is not the system that will promote the 
most economic growth."). 
49 [d. at 14. 
so [d. at 19. 
51 See id. at 29. Although these data relates to equipment loans, I would 
expect approximately the same interest rate differentIal to apply to loans se-
cured by receivables because the perfection and priority problem is similar. 
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cure[d] transactions."52 Therefore, twenty-seven to thirty-two 
percentage points of Guatemala's interest rate cost "arises entirely 
from the laws and legal procedures that govern lending against 
movable property.,,53 By way of comparison, the Center's study 
of Nicaragua found that twenty to twenty-five percentage points 
of interest rate cost was attributed to defects in that State's 
framework for secured transactions.54 The study also reported 
that "[u]nder a variety of simplifying assumptions [reform of the 
legal framework for secured transactions in Argentina and Bo-
livia] could raise Argentine GDP by 6% to 8%" and could raise 
Bolivian GDP by 3% to 9%? 
The Center's studies of the legal frameworks for secured 
transactions in Romania and Nicaragua found similar problems 
caused bl the absence of centralized registration systems for per-
fection.5 The studies also reported that these problems have been 
observed in other civil law States such as Argentina, Mexico, 
52 Id. 
53 Id. The absence of centralized registration is, of course, only part of the 
reason for this cost, but probably the most significant part. See supra text ac-
companying note 46 (noting that the absence of centralized registration is the 
most significant explanation for why credit is limited). 
54 See Nicaragua, supra note 47, at 27. Again, the absence of centralized reg-
istration is only part of the reason for this cost, but probably the most signifi-
cant part. See supra note 46. 
55 Guatemala, supra note 46, at 44. Subsequent studies by the Center for 
the Economic Analy:sis of Law indicate the same or even larger gain in GDP. 
See Electronic Mail from Heywood W. Fleisig to Steven L. Schwarcz (May 6, 
1999) (on file with the author). 
56 In Nicaragua, for example, "[p ]erfection rules do not call for registries 
that provide for a public and mexEensive means of finding out whether prior 
encumbrances in collateral exist. The rules for the priority of secured lenders 
do not clearly rank interests in collateral." Nicaragua, supra note 47, at 2. As a 
result, "secret priorities create substantial risks to other potential lenders and 
thereby limit the usefulness of the secured transaction framework." Id. at 19. 
Indeed, "[a]ccounts receivable and chattel paper had no value as collateral for 
loans." Id. at 16. These problems even overcame attempts by the Nicaraguan 
government to stimulate agricultural credit by setting up a system "that would 
disburse through J?rivate for-profit institutions. . .. Private lenders, in [this] 
framework ... took great care to disburse only: where loans could be collected. 
However, in most cases this improvement in [lending] efficiency took place at 
the expenses of reaching the target ~roups [which had] even less access to 
credit." Id. at 3. Likewise, in Romarua, in which perfection requires notifica-
tion of debtors, no borrowing credit is given based solely on accounts receiv-
able collateral. See Nuria de la Pefia & Heywood W. Fleisig, Romania: How 
Problems in the Framework for Secured Transactions Limit Access to Credit (Sep. 
1998 discussion draft) < http://www.ceal.org > [hereinafter Romania]. 
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Uruguay, Bolivia, Honduras, and EI Salvador as well as in com-
mon law States such as Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. 57 
These empirical studies are not merely academic. An increas-
ing number of States have been adopting centralized registration 
precisely for the reasons noted by the studies: to improve their 
economy by increasing access to lower-cost credit. I set forth the 
following five examples: Japan, Poland, and Hungary, which are 
from civil law systems; and Canada and Australia, which are from 
common law systems. 
4.2.2. An Increasing Number o/States Have Been Adopting 
Centralized Registration 
Japan adopted a centralized registration system in 1998_ Pre-
viously, perfection required notification of debtors, which was a 
significant impediment to securitization. 58 To encourage and 
lower the cost of securitization, a new law was adopted allowing 
constructive notice by registration:59 «if the claim assignment is 
registered in a claim assignment registration file, it shall be re-
garded, in relation to a third party, that notice ... is given to the 
debtors [on the date of registration], as provided for under Article 
467 of the Civil Code."60 The priority rule therefore is first in 
time, first in right.61 
57 See Nicaragua, supra note 47, at 5. See also Boris Kozolchyk, The Basis 
for Proposed Lee,islation to Modernize Secured Financing in Mexico, 5 U.S.-MEx. 
L.J.43 (1997) (Cliscussing the need for a centralized registration system for per-
fection of security interests in Mexico). Kozolchyk claims that without such a 
"system of registration for security interests," commercial credit will not be 
accessible for "small and medium-slZed Mexican [enterprises]." Id. at 47-48. As 
a result, Mexico is in the process of considering legislation which would create 
a centralized registration system. Id. at 50-52. 
58 See Roy B. True, New Developments in Japanese Asset Securitization: 
Open the Floodgates (visited Mar. 31, 1999) <http://www.tuj.ac.jp/law/ asset-
sec.htm1>. 
59 Saikenjyoto no Taikoyoken ni kansuru Minpo no Tokureito ni kansuru 
Horitsu [The Law Prescribin~ Exceptions, etc. to the Civil Code Requirements 
for Setting Up Against a ThIrd Party to an Assi~nment of Claims], Law No. 
104 of 1998 (effective October 1, 1998). RegistratlOn would be deemed to con-
stitute notification. The author thanks Japanese attorney Makoto Isshiki, 
LL.M., 1999 Duke University School of Law for assistance m interpreting this 
law. 
60 Id. art. 2(1). 
61 Some confusion could arise when perfection first occurs through actual 
notification, as opposed to registration. 
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In 1996, the Polish Parliament enacted a new secured transac-
tions law that substitutes registration for a physical pledge in or-
der to achieve perfection.62 Under that law, a security interest, re-
ferred to as a "registered pledge," may be granted in moveable 
assets and in assignable rights, such as receivables.63 The security 
interest is perfected when registered in the appropriate district 
commercial court.64 Moreover, the law chanres the old posses-
sory priority rule of last in time, last in right6 to a first in time, 
first in right rule based on the timing of registration.66 The ra-
tionale for the law was that "a reliable universal registering sys-
tem is sine qua non for the banks to proceed with a responsible 
credit policy.,,67 
In 1996, the Hungarian Parliament enacted a new secured 
transactions law.68 Under that law, a security interest, referred to 
as a lien, may be granted in moveable things and in transferable 
rights or claims.69 The security interest is perfected when regis-
tered in a registIfo kept with the Hungarian National Chamber of 
Notaries Public. 0 The priority rule is based on first in time, first 
in right.71 
62 See Ustawa 0 zastawie regestrowym i regestrze zastaw6w [Law on Regis-
tered Pledge and Pled~e Register] Dz. U. Nr 149, poz. 703 Uournal of Law No. 
149, item 703] (pol.) tenacted December 6, 1996 and later amended in 1997 and 
1998); Tomasz Dabrowski, Poland's New Security Instrument- Registered 
Pledge, 8 SURV. E. EUR. L. 1, 8 (1997). 
63 See Dabrowski supra note 62. 
64 See id. 
65 Even in the U.S., perfection of possessory security interests would fol-
low this rule because a prior pledgee that no longer possesses the collateral 
would be unsecured. See U.C.C. § 9-305 (1995) (providing that perfection by 
possession "continues only so long as possession is retained."). 
66 See Dabrowski, supra note 62, at 8 (noting that under prior law, a subse-
quent pledge would prevail over a prior pledge, absent bad fruth). 
67 Lech Choroszucha, Secured Transactions in Poland: Practicable Rules, 
Unworkable Monstrosities, and Pending Reforms, 17 HASTINGS lNT'L & COMPo 
L. REv. 389,409 (1994); see also id. at 423 (arguing that this law will help "pro-
vide for stability and predictability in commercial lending transactions"). 
68 CODE CIVIL [C.CIv.] act XXVI (Hung.). The author thanks Hungarian 
attorney Szilvia Horvath, LL.M., 1999 Duke University School of Law, for as-
sistance in finding and interpreting this law and the related Ministry of Justice 
comments. 
69 See id. § 252(1). 
70 See id. § 260(2». 
71 See id. § 263(2» {stating that "if the same obj~ct under lien is encum-
bered by several liens, ... the right of satisfaction shall be due to the lienors in 
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Canada's perfection scheme, by contrast, has been adopted 
province by province over the past two decades in an attempt to 
modernize personal property security laws.72 The Canadian 
scheme follows the Uniform Personal Property Security Act (the 
"PPSA "), "[a]n indispensable feature of [which] is the registry sys-
tem that is at the core of the priority structure of the Act."73 Sec-
tion 25 of the PPSA provides that registration of a financing 
statement perfects a security interest in collateral74 and Section 43 
establishes a first in time, first in right priority rule, based on the 
timing of registration.75 At least one commentator noted that the 
"PPSA's have been an unqualified success. There are very few 
Canadians who have any interest in returning to the systems they 
displaced." 76 
Finally, Australia has a national system for recording security 
interests, referred to as "charges," that are granted by compa-
nies.77 The priority rule is first in time, first in right, according to 
the timing of registration.78 
In short, empirical studies by the Center for the Economic 
Analysis of Law show that centralized registration increases the 
the order of the inception of their respective liens, [inception being determined 
by the time of registration). 
n See generally Ross Buckley, Personal Property Security Law in Canada: 
The Revolution Is Nearly Complete, 72 AUSTI. L.J. 918 (1998) (describing this 
new legal regime, whicli has been adopted by all the common law provinces of 
Canada other than Newfoundland, where the bill is now pending, and observ-
in~ that a J?arallel conceptual regime has been adopted by the civil law province 
of Quebec). The Canadian regime appears to oe closely patterned on UCC 
Article 9. ld. at 919. It even deems "sales of accounts and chattel paper to be 
security agreements, principally to avoid difficult problems of diStinguishing 
between transactions Intended for security and those not so intended." ld. 
73 ld. at 918. 
74 See UNIF. PERSONAL PROPERTY SEC. ACT § 25 (Uniform Law Confer-
ence of Canada Consolidated Statutes 1983) [hereinafter"PPSA"] 
75 PPSA § 43(2) provides that "[r]egistration of a financing statement is ef-
fective from the time assigned to it in the office of the registry." PPSA § 
35(1)(a) further provides tliat "priority between perfected security interests in 
the same collateral is determined by the order of the occurrence of the ... 
registration of a financing statement .... " ld. § 43(2). 
76 Buckley, supra note 72, at 923. See also id. at 918 (observing that "[t]here 
is little dissent now that the legislation has met and surpassed the objectives of 
its proponents"). 
77 See Corporations Act, 1989, § 262 (Austl.). The author thanks Austra-
lian attorney, Matthew Symon, LL.M 1999, Duke University School of Law, 
for assistance in finding and interpreting this law. 
78 See id. § 280(1). 
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availability of credit and reduces its cost. An increasing number 
of civil and common law States have recently voted with their 
feet in agreement, adopting centralized registration systems.79 
States that oppose centralized registration therefore may wish to 
re-think whether their opposition is justified. 
I next argue that the evolution of perfection and priority rules 
in the United States further underscores the value of centralized 
registration. I analogize the federal system of the United States, 
under which each state had its own law governing perfection, to 
the international scheme today under which each sovereign State 
has its own perfection law. 80 
4.3. The Development of Centralized Registration in the Federal 
System of the United States Provides Compelling Evidence 
in Favor of a Cross-Border Registration System 
The UCC governs, among other things, the perfection and 
priority of the transfer of receivables between parties in different 
states in the United States. It reflects almost a century of experi-
mentation by those states to try to reach the most efficient and 
effective perfection system. Thus, an analysis of the events lead-
ing up to the UCC's adoption may shed light on the cross-border 
receivables perfection debate. Historically, receivables financing 
in the United States had its roots in traditional factoring, in 
which "typically the assignee (or factor) notified the account 
debtor that the account had been assigned to him and directed 
that payments be made to him and not to the assignor."8t Begin-
79 The process of adoption continues. In New Zealand, for example, a new 
Personal Property Securities Bill based on the Canadian PPSA is at the select 
committee stage, and submissions are currently being heard. Although some 
believe it will be enacted in 2000, the timing is uncertain. See Electronic Mail 
from Steve Flynn, attorney with Simpson Grierson and member of the New 
Zealand Law Society committee that reviewed this Bill, to Andrew McNee, 
LL.M., 1999 Duke University School of Law (Apr. 7, 1999) (on file with 
author). 
80 I realize, of course, that analogies are useful but not necessarily defini-
tive. Compare RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 519 (1995) rarguiIlg 
that "[a]nruogies can be suggestive, even illuminating" but might not be suffi-
ciently on point by reason of different facts or policles)with Cass R. Sunstein, 
On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARv. L. REv. 741 (1993) (arguing that an anal-
ogy is most useful when the right outcome cannot be derived from theory 
alone). 
81 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 
8.1, at 251 (1965). 
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ning in the 1930's, however, a new form of receivables financing 
arose under which "account debtors were no longer notified of 
the assignment and continued to make payments to their original 
creditor, the assignor."82 By the 1950's, receivables financing was 
split between non-notification receivables financing and tradi-
tional factoring.83 
These forms of receivables financing created practical and legal 
problems, some practical and some legal. As a practical matter, 
because: 
there is no evidence of the claim which can be symboli-
cally treated as the claim itself and thus transferred in pos-
session [such as would be the case for a negotiable instru-
ment], the problem of priorities early became and long 
remained a matter of controversy and a thorn in the judi-
cial flesh.84 
Assignees of receivables bore the risk that the assignor would 
assign (or perhaps already had assigned) the same receivables to 
another assignee. 
In response, different states established different rules to try to 
address the priority problem posed by receivables financing. In-
deed, "[i]n few [other] common law areas did so many diverse 
rules establish themselves or so long and so inconclusively con-
tend among themselves for supremacy.,,85 For example, certain 
states, such as New York, followed the rule that perfection is ef-
fectively achieved by "policing" the sold receivables through 
monitoring and collecting the payments thereon.86 The cost and 
expertise needed to comply with this rule made non-notification 
receivables financing "the exclusive preserve of the sales finance 
82 Id. (describinl? this new form of factoring as "non-notification" or "indio 
rect collection" receivables financing). 
83 See id. 
84 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 
25.6, at 670 (1965). 
85 Id. 
86 See Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925) (finding an unpoliced trans-
fer of receivables fraudulent under New York law as against creditors of the 
assignor). 
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companies ... [and] larger banks."87 Other states followed the 
English rule of Dearie v. Hall88_ a rule similar to that which pre-
vails in many foreign countries even today89 - "under which, as 
between successive assignees of the same claim, the one who first 
notifies the [account] debtor of his assircnment prevails, even 
though his assignment is the later in time." 0 
These problems were compounded in interstate transactions. 
Say, for example, an assignor in New York, which followed the 
policing rule, transferred receivables to an assignee in Pennsylva-
nia, which followed the debtor notification rule. To ensure per-
fection, the parties might have to comply with both rules, 
thereby duplicating cost and effort. 
These issues came to a head when the United States Supreme 
Court held that because the failure to notify debtors prevented 
perfection of the transfer in states that followed Dearie v. Hall, 
the assignor's trustee in bankruptcy could have avoided the un-
perfected transfer.91 This caused great uncertainty in the receiv-
ables financing community. In response, "the majority of states 
enacted statutes [that] were designed to preserve non-notification 
financing." 92 
This led to a heated debate as to the best method of perfec-
tion, with different states experimenting with differing ap-
proaches.93 Business interests argued that transfers of receivables 
should be automatically deemed to be perfected, because they 
were concerned that their credit "would be adversely- even dis-
astrously- affected if [their] creditors learned that [they were] as-
87 1 GILMORE, supra note 81, § 8.1, at 252; see also id. § 8.3, at 260-61 (de-
scribing the "assignee's unremitting supervision of the assignor's enterprise" 
that constituted "policing" to comply with Benedict). This rule still created 
problems, however, where assignors were the more competent party to moni-
tor and enforce collections for the account of the assignee. 
88 3 Russ. 1, 38 Eng. Rep. 475 (Ch. 1828). Professor Gilmore refers to an 
estimate that "6 states and the District of Columbia definitely followed [this] 
rule, 7 states probably followed [this] rule, [and] 10 states were in extreme con-
fusion as to which rule they followed." 1 GILMORE, supra note 81, § 8.6, at 
273 n.8. 
89 Indeed, research by the Center for the Economic Analysis of Law indi-
cates that this rule is seen in both common and civil law countries. See supra 
text accompanying notes 55-56. 
90 1 GILMORE, supra note 81, § 8.6, at 273. 
91 See Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943). 
92 1 GILMORE, supra note 81, § 8.1, at 253. 
93 See ide § 8.7, at 274 et seq. (discussing the debate among states). 
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signing [their] accounts_,,94 Others argued for a registration sys-
tem. The experience of states that chose a registration system 
showed that registration would not adversely affect, but would 
increase, the availability of credit: "[o]nce filing statutes had been 
passed in a few states, the argument that a public record of as-
signments would destroy business credit became more difficult to 
make .... In the final count, filing statutes considerably outnum-
bered [automatic perfection] statutes.,,95 
The subsequent promulgation of the uee, in 1953, resolved 
these issues for all interstate (as well as intrastate) transfers. It fol-
lowed the lessons learned from the state debate, adopting a cen-
tralized registration system96 and rejecting the requirements of po-
licing and debtor notification.97 This registration system gave 
"other creditors the opportunity to ascertain from public sources 
whether property of their debtor [here, in the uee sense, mean-
ing the borrower] or prospective debtor is subject to secured 
claims." 98 As a result, interstate receivables transfers have been 
greatly facilitated, while their cost has been significantly lowered. 
I recognize, of course, that the u.s. experience with the uee and 
registration does not necessarily compel the conclusion that for-
eign states with fundamentally different legal, economic or cul-
tural systems also should adopt centralized registration. N onethe-
94 Id. § 8.7, at 275. 
95 Id. 
96 The VCC registration system is not, however, centralized in an ortho-
dox way. Rather, each state maintains its own centralized registration system, 
and choice of law rules determine which state's system will apply to a Earticu-
lar transfer. See V.C.C. § 9-103 (1995). My sug~ested compromise of allowing 
states the oFtion of adopting (or retaining) their own centralized registration 
~stems, subject to the Convention's choice of law rule that points to the per-
fection system of the assignor's State, would follow that approach. See supra 
note 34. 
97 See id. (explaining that "[b]y the time Article 9 of the [Uniform Com-
mercial] Code came to be drafted, it was a foregone conclusion that, with re-
sEect to receivables, it would be a ruing statute and not even the most violent 
aavocate of [automatic perfection] made more than a pro forma protest for the 
record"). 
98 Official Comment No.3 to V.C.c. § 9-205 (1995) (further eXElaining 
that "[t]he repeal of the Benedict rule under this section [9-205] must be read 
in light of these [flling] provisions"); accord V.C.C. § 9-205 (providing that "raJ 
security interest is not Invalid or fraudulent against creditors by reason of lib-
erty in the debtor to use, commingle or dispose of all or part of the collateral . 
•. or to collect or compromise accounts or chattel paper .... "). 
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less, the u.s. experience is persuasive in the absence of evidence 
to the contrary. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Empirical evidence and historical analogy demonstrate the 
benefits of a centralized registration system for perfection of re-
ceivables financing. It increases corporate access to lower cost 
credit, which in turn increases a State's gross domestic product. 
Absent such a system, receivables financings are discouraged be-
cause assignees may be unable to know their priority. Therefore, 
it appears to be in each State's interest that the Convention pro-
vides, and that each State opts for, centralized registration. 
